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MARY ANNE CASE

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FROM THE PAST
OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES?

Race and religion each have a privileged position in the American
constitutional scheme: Both racial equality and religious freedom
are central commitments of modern American constitutionalism.
Similar awareness of historical abuses has led to a wariness about
the uses of both racial and religious classiﬁcations by government
actors. At the same time, the dangers of oppression and exclusion
make acknowledgment of race or religion difﬁcult to avoid. This
tension between the importance and the danger of race and religion has led to similar oscillations in the constitutional case law,
with a satisfactory equilibrium position difﬁcult to attain in either
ﬁeld. Currently, the pendulum of case law is swinging in somewhat
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opposite directions for race and religion. While the trend has been
toward increasing explicit inclusion of religion and the religious
(whether literally in the public square1 or more broadly in funding
and subsidy opportunities2), by contrast, recent cases seem increasingly to question any explicit use of race, even in areas of law, such
as afﬁrmative action and voting rights, where the intent of such
use is to include rather than oppress or exclude minorities.
In this article, I want to press some analogies between the constitutional law of race and of religion, analogies I believe have implications for the future of both afﬁrmative action and raceconscious districting.3 My contention is that the Supreme Court’s
attitude toward race, at least in the two contexts of educational
afﬁrmative action and voting rights, should follow the same trajectory as its attitude toward religion already has.4 The trajectory I
have in mind is the following: For a period of time, on Establish1
See, e.g., Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984), and its progeny; Widmar v Vincent, 454
US 263 (1981) and its progeny.
2
See, e.g., Rosenberger v Rector and Visitors of U. Va., 515 US 819 (1995).
3
Numerous commentators over the past decade have suggested or contested analogies
between the constitutional treatment of race and that of religion. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of ‘‘Our Constitution Is Color Blind,’’ 44 Stan L Rev 1, 64–68 (1991) (suggesting
that ‘‘[t]he free exercise and establishment clause decisions provide a model for constitutional adjudication in the area of race to supplant the color-blind model’’ and introducing
concepts of ‘‘free exercise of race’’ and ‘‘racial establishment’’); Giradeau A. Spann, Afﬁrmative Action and Discrimination, 39 Howard L J 1, 86–89 (1995) (arguing that ‘‘Rosenberger
and Adarand involved the same basic constitutional problem but arrived at contradictory
results’’). Many have focused on whether governmental accommodation of the religious
practice of minority religions through exemption from generally applicable laws can fruitfully be compared to afﬁrmative action for racial minorities. See, e.g., Jesse Choper, Religion
and Race Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 Cornell L Rev 491 (1994);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 Ind
L Rev 77, 95–103 (2000); Abner Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
Colum L Rev 1, 58 (1996); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling
the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 Ind L Rev 119 (1997). Other commentators have
compared majority-minority districting for racial and religious minorities. See, e.g., Thomas
C. Berg, Religion, Race, Segregation, and Districting: Comparing Kiryas Joel with Shaw/Miller,
26 Cumb L Rev 365 (1996); James U. Blacksher, Majority Black Districts, Kiryas Joel and
Other Challenges to American Nationalism, 26 Cumb L Rev 407 (1996); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reﬂections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno,
26 Cumb L Rev 515 (1996).
4
In an effort to reduce the number of moving parts in the discussion, I take the Court’s
current religion clause jurisprudence as a given. This jurisprudence seems to me (although
not to everyone) to be comparatively settled, while the Court’s jurisprudence of race is
more open and confused at the moment. My objective is not to endorse or defend the
holdings in Widmar, Rosenberger, or their progeny, or in any other case or line of cases
involving religion. Rather, I start from the premise that these cases are the law and ask
what implications the Supreme Court majority’s approach in these cases has or should have
for cases concerning educational afﬁrmative action and majority-minority districting.
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ment Clause grounds, the exclusion of religion and the religious
from otherwise generally available opportunities was endorsed, indeed, was seen as constitutionally required. Then the Court came
to realize that it worked a discrimination against those whose central organizing characteristic or salient trait was their religion to
allow other such characteristics, but not religion, to form the basis
for inclusion. Similarly, to allow every other basis for commonality
or salience to count and not race may be seen to disadvantage
those for whom race is a deﬁning characteristic in a way that itself
implicates the Equal Protection Clause.5
That the trend on the current Court is to exclude only race as
the basis for forming a community of interest in voting rights cases
and that this works a problematic discrimination against those
whose basis for community is their race is clear to commentators
on and off the Court. As Lani Guinier put it, ‘‘In contemporary
discourse, colorblindness has come to mean that mere recognition
of race, except to condemn intentional racial discrimination, is
dangerous. Yet, because of the recognition and support our political system gives to other, non-racial groups, colorblindness, although ostensibly race-neutral, singles out race for special treatment.’’ 6 And, as Justice Stevens ﬁrst observed as a lower court
judge, ‘‘an interpretation of the Constitution which afforded one
kind of political protection to blacks and another kind to members
of other identiﬁable groups would in itself be invidious.’’ 7 Each of
5
Compare Washington v Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 US 457 (1982) (holding unconstitutional state initiative allowing busing of schoolchildren away from their neighborhood
school for virtually all reasons other than to achieve racial integration).
6
Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights
Cases, 108 Harv L Rev 109 at 123, n 104 (1994). See also James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott’s
Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 Howard L J 633 (1996) (‘‘The
problem with the Shaw Cases is not simply that they have launched the federal courts into
uncharted (indeed unchartable) political waters in an effort to restrain excessive gerrymandering, but that the only shoal they have marked as hazardous is racial classiﬁcations. By
leaving legislative bodies free to squiggle district boundaries for partisan political purposes,
to protect incumbents, or for any other nonracial reason, the Court has suggested—if it
has not actually ruled—that it is black and Latino citizens alone who may not choose to
associate with each other freely and try to optimize their legislative inﬂuence in pursuit of
a common political agenda.’’).
7
Cousins v City Council of Chicago, 466 F2d 830, 852 (7th Cir 1972) (Stevens dissenting).
Although, in the context of Cousins, Stevens’s point was that blacks should not be given a
different and greater kind of political protection than members of other groups, in recent
dissents from Supreme Court districting cases, Stevens has made clear his view is also that
it would be invidious to offer different and lesser protection to blacks. See, e.g., Shaw v
Hunt, 517 US 899, 949 (1996) (Stevens dissenting) (‘‘Nor do I see how our constitutional
tradition can countenance the suggestion that a State may draw unsightly lines to favor
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the other habitual Supreme Court dissenters to the Shaw v Reno8
line of majority-minority districting cases has made a similar
point.9
Though the force of these observations has thus far escaped a
majority of the current Court, that same majority has come to a
similar realization in the context of the religion clauses. As Justice
O’Connor put it in one of a line of recent cases mandating that
the religious be afforded the ‘‘recognition and support’’ given
other groups, ‘‘if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities
open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hosfarmers or city dwellers, but not to create districts that beneﬁt the very group whose history
inspired the Amendment that the Voting Rights Act was designed to implement’’); Bush v
Vera, 517 US 952, 1035 (1995) (Stevens dissenting) (‘‘After the Court’s decisions today,
therefore, minority voters can make up a majority only in compact districts, . . . while white
voters can be placed into districts as bizarre as the State desires. . . . Unaffected by the new
racial jurisprudence, majority-white communities will be able to participate in the districting
process by requesting that they be placed in certain districts, divided between districts in
an effort to maximize representation, or grouped with more distant communities that might
nonetheless match their interests better than communities next door. By contrast, none
of this political maneuvering will be permissible for majority-minority districts, thereby
segregating and balkanizing them far more effectively than the Districts here at issue, in
which they were manipulated in the political process as easily as white voters. This result,
it seems to me, involves ‘discrimination’ in a far more concrete manner than did the odd
shapes that offended the Court’s sensibilities in Miller, Shaw II and Bush.’’).
8

509 US 630 (1993).
See, e.g., Abrams v Johnson, 521 US 74, 117–18 (1997) (Breyer dissenting) (‘‘Thus, given
today’s suit, a legislator might reasonably wonder whether he can ever knowingly place
racial minorities in a district because, for example, he considers them part of a ‘community’
already there. . . . And the legislator will need a legal principle that tells whether, or when,
the answers to such questions vary depending on whether the group is racial or reﬂects,
say, economics, education, or national origin. . . . Further, any test that applied only to
race, ignoring, say, religion or national origin, would place at a disadvantage the very group,
African Americans, whom the Civil War Amendments sought to help.’’); Bush v Vera, 517
US at 1066 (Souter dissenting) (‘‘[I]t is in theory and in fact impossible to apply ‘traditional
districting principles’ in areas with substantial minority populations without considering
race. . . . It therefore may well be that the loss of the capacity to protect minority incumbency is the price of the rule limiting States’ use of racial data. If so, it will be an exceedingly
odd result, when the whole point of creating yesterday’s majority-minority districts was to
remedy prior dilution, thus permitting the election of the minority incumbent who (the
Court now seems to declare) cannot be protected as any other incumbent could be.’’); Miller
v Johnson, 515 US 900, 947 (1995) (Ginsburg dissenting) (‘‘In adopting districting plans,
however, States do not treat people as individuals. . . . Rather, legislators classify voters in
groups—by economic, geographical, political, or social characteristics—and then ‘reconcile
the competing claims of [these] groups.’ . . . That ethnicity deﬁnes some of these groups
is a political reality. . . . Until now, no constitutional inﬁrmity has been seen in districting
Irish or Italian voters together, for example, so long as the delineation does not abandon
familiar apportionment practices. . . . If Chinese-Americans and Russian-Americans may
seek and secure group recognition in the delineation of voting districts, then AfricanAmericans should not be dissimilarly treated. Otherwise, in the name of equal protection,
we would shut out ‘the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth
to the Equal Protection Clause.’ ’’) (citations omitted).
9
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tility toward religion. The Establishment Clause does not license
government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it,
simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American
ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities.’’ 10
To put the argument that follows in extremely compressed and
referential form, if colorblindness is analogous to aggressive enforcement of the Establishment Clause, then, while the University
of California’s use of race in the plan struck down in Bakke11 may
resemble the New York legislature’s use of religion in the districting legislation struck down in Kiryas Joel,12 the inclusion of
race in the Harvard admissions plan praised by Justice Powell13
more closely resembles the inclusion of religion mandated by the
Supreme Court for the University of Virginia’s funding scheme in
Rosenberger.14 And, if the afﬁrmative action claims of racial minorities are like the accommodation claims of religious minorities,
then, while some voluntary pursuit of racial diversity by public educational institutions is like permissible accommodation, some majority-minority districting under the Voting Rights Act is like required accommodation. This is in part because the Equal
Protection Clause itself may demand it, and in part because the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are like the Free Exercise
Clause—counterweights to the presumption against state use of
race or religion.
I wish to focus inquiry, not merely on any formal parallels in
the structure of these arguments, but also on some of the common
underlying concerns that special governmental treatment of the
salient characteristics of race and religion may have. When ‘‘one
of the [emerging] philosophical touchstones of the current Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence is giving content to the elusive line

10
Bd. of Ed. of Westside Community Schools v Mergens, 496 US 226, 248 (1990) (citing
Brennan’s concurrence in McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618, 641 (1978)).
11
See Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978) (striking down set
aside of speciﬁed number of slots in state medical school class for disadvantaged members of
minority groups).
12
See Bd of Ed. of Kiryas Joel v Grumet, 512 US 687 (1994) (holding New York legislature’s
establishment of a special school district for a community of Satmar Hasidim
unconstitutional).
13

See Bakke, 438 US at 321 (1978).
See Rosenberger, 515 US 819 (requiring university student activities’ funding scheme to
include a student publication dedicated to promoting an evangelical Christian viewpoint).
14
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between ‘equal rights’ and ‘special preferences,’ ’’15 it seems worth
exploring how the Court may walk that line differently for race
and religion. While the Constitutional and sociopolitical reasons
for worrying about ‘‘special preferences’’ for race and religion are
far from identical, similar distortions in the landscape may occur
when race or religion are eliminated by Constitutional force from
the picture, and there are similar risks of divisiveness surrounding
the question of their inclusion.
Just as the drafters of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses had centuries of the established churches of Europe and
of England as cautionary backdrop,16 so the drafters of the Civil
War Amendments had centuries of black chattel slavery.17 In neither case did this history lead to an immediate abolition of state
use of the dangerous categories: state religious establishment continued after the passage of the First Amendment and Jim Crow
established both racial categorization and white supremacy for
nearly a century after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I use the term ‘‘established’’ advisedly—parallels can readily be
drawn between the position of whites under Jim Crow and members of an established church. Compare, for example, the Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion,
which gave rise to Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments18 with the use of Southern state tax dollars to
support public education for whites only.19 Compare the degree of

15
Richard Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 Yale L J
2505, 2511 (1997).
16
See, e.g., Everson v Board of Ed., 330 US 1 (1946) (‘‘The centuries immediately before
and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been ﬁlled with turmoil, civil
strife and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects. . . . These practices
. . . transplanted to the soil of the new America . . . shock[ed] the freedom-loving colonists
into a feeling of abhorrence.’’).
17
See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US 36 (1873) (‘‘[I]n the light of events almost
too recent to be called history, . . . and on the most casual examination of the language
of these amendments, . . . no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in them all, . . . we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and ﬁrm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.’’).
18
The Bill and Madison’s Memorial are each reprinted as an appendix to Douglas’s opinion in Walz v Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 716–26 (1970).
19
See Cumming v Bd. of Ed., 175 US 528 (1899) (unsuccessfully challenging use of black
tax dollars for white high school).

7]

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

331

concern the law accords marriage within an established church20
with Virginia’s concern, in the statute struck down in Loving, with
the racial purity of marriages of whites only.21 Is it too much of
a stretch to hear in Harlan’s insistence in his Plessy dissent that
the white race ‘‘will continue to be for all time [the dominant race],
if it remains true to its great heritage,’’ 22 the words of a true believer denying that establishment of his faith is necessary to its
continued dominance?
By the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court mandated the
end of both racial and religious establishment, incorporating the
Establishment Clause against the states and putting an end to Jim
Crow. It is perhaps no accident that many of the early contested
cases in both spheres involved education. In the area of race and
the schools, the Supreme Court moved from increasingly aggressive enforcement of separate but equal standards to the rejection
of legally established separateness in Brown. It spent the rest of
the century working through the required and permissible boundaries for the use of race in ending educational segregation. Among
its leading afﬁrmative action cases were two, Bakke and Wygant,23
concerning the use of race in selecting, respectively, students and
teachers.
Although the Supreme Court has not recently decided a case in
the area, lower courts have continued to struggle with the use of
racial afﬁrmative action in the schools. Early in 2001, two district
judges in the Eastern District of Michigan reached opposite conclusions with respect to the uses of race in admissions by two units
of the same university. In the more recent case, Grutter v. Bollinger,24 Judge Bernard Friedman struck down the University of
Michigan Law School’s ‘‘race-conscious’’ admissions policy and
20
See, e.g., An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages, popularly known
as Lord Harwicke’s Act or the Marriage Act of 1753 (recognizing only marriages performed
by ministers of the established Church of England in accordance with prescribed rules).
21
See Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute, which prohibited only racially mixed marriages in which one partner was
white).
22
Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan dissenting).
23

Wygant v Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 US 267 (1986).
2001 US Dist Lexis 3256 (ED Mich 2001). The Sixth Circuit issued a stay pending
appeal so that the University of Michigan Law School could complete its admissions season.
Grutter v Bollinger, 2001 US App Lexis 5606 (6th Cir 2001).
24
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held that any future policy must be ‘‘race-neutral.’’ Only a few
months earlier, in Gratz v Bollinger,25 his colleague Judge Patrick
Duggan had upheld the University of Michigan’s undergraduate
admissions ofﬁce’s current use of race as a factor in admissions.
The law school and the undergraduate admissions ofﬁce did have
somewhat different approaches to the use of race as a factor in
admissions. Judge Friedman found that, for the law school, ‘‘race
is not . . . merely one factor which is considered among many
others in the admissions process’’ but rather ‘‘the law school places
a very heavy emphasis on an applicant’s race in deciding whether
or not to accept or reject.’’ More importantly, however, the two
judges also reached signiﬁcantly different conclusions as to the law
that they applied to their respective facts. In Gratz, Judge Duggan,
following the path laid out in Powell’s Bakke opinion, distinguished
the Michigan undergraduate admissions ofﬁce’s most recent use of
race as one of many factors, which he upheld, from its more rigid
and singular use of race in earlier years, which he held to have
been unconstitutional. In contrast, Judge Friedman, in addition to
ﬁnding an absence of narrow tailoring in the law school’s use of
race in admissions, also held categorically, and directly contrary
to Judge Duggan, that ‘‘the achievement of [racial] diversity is not
a compelling state interest.’’ The Ninth Circuit, in a case involving
admission to the University of Washington School of Law, recently took the opposite position, holding that ‘‘educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets the demands
of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures.’’ 26 Federal circuit
courts have recently become much more aggressive in their opposition to the use of racial classiﬁcations, with the Fifth Circuit in
Hopwood banning any use of race in admissions decisions by the
University of Texas Law School,27 the Third Circuit in Taxman
barring the use of race as a tiebreaker in determining which of two
equally qualiﬁed teachers should be laid off,28 the Fourth Circuit in
25

122 F Supp 2d 811 (ED Mich 2000).
Smith v Univ. of Washington, 233 F3d 1188 (9th Cir 2000). The policy with respect to
the use of race at issue in Smith was discontinued after the passage in 1998 of Initiative
Measure 200, which, inter alia, forbade the State of Washington to ‘‘discriminate against,
or grant any preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race . . . in
the operation of . . . public education.’’ Id at 1192.
26

27

Hopwood v Texas, 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir 1996).
Piscatawy Township Bd. of Ed. v Taxman, 91 F3d 1547 (3d Cir 1996). The Supreme
Court took cert in this case, but it was settled after brieﬁng and before argument.
28
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Podberesky striking down a scholarship program for exceptionally
talented black applicants to the University of Maryland,29 and the
D.C. Circuit holding FCC pressure on broadcasters to recruit minorities unconstitutional.30
In so doing, these circuit courts claim to be responding to signals sent by a Supreme Court that appears to them to have both
intensiﬁed its scrutiny of 31 and narrowed its list of acceptable justiﬁcations for governmental use of 32 racial classiﬁcations in efforts
to beneﬁt minority groups. While some of these signals came in
traditional afﬁrmative action cases involving employment opportunities of one sort or another,33 a majority of the Court has also
increasingly restricted the use of race in an effort to beneﬁt minorities in the political process through the creation of majorityminority districts.
It is not my intent to summarize or analyze the full development
of Supreme Court case law concerning either race or the religion
clauses over the past several decades. Instead, for both educational
afﬁrmative action and the use of race in districting, I want to pursue parallels with the Supreme Court’s religion clause jurisprudence in aid of my argument that the approach mapped out by
the Powell opinion in Bakke, the Michigan District Court in Gratz,
and the Supreme Court dissenters in the recent voting rights
cases34 makes more sense as a part of our constitutional law than
29

Podberesky v Kirwan, 38 F3d 1884 (4th Cir 1994).
MD/DC/DE Broadcasters v FCC, 2001 US App Lexis 570 (DC Cir 2001). I include
the broadcasting cases within the scope of a discussion otherwise centered on educational
afﬁrmative action and districting because the broadcasting cases, unlike, for example, cases
examining afﬁrmative action in the construction industry, focus on issues of diversity and
community rather than simply on remedying prior discrimination.
30

31
For example, by holding that federal as well as state use of racial classiﬁcations for
afﬁrmative action was subject to strict scrutiny. Adarand v Pena, 515 US 200 (1995).
32
For example, by rejecting the so-called role model justiﬁcation for afﬁrmative action
in selecting teachers. Wygant, 476 US at 274.
33
See, in particular, Adarand, 515 US 200, requiring strict scrutiny for all racial classiﬁcations, including those used by the federal government in an effort to aid minorities. It is
worth noting that, on remand, the Tenth Circuit took to heart the notion that strict scrutiny
need no longer be ‘‘fatal in fact’’ and held a revamped program for ‘‘disadvantaged business
enterprises’’ in construction subcontracting to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest in remedying the nationwide effects of past and present discrimination against racial minorities in the construction industry. Adarand Constructors v Slater, 228
F3d 1147 (10th Cir 2000).
34
Because I believe the argument in the districting cases is stronger and simpler and has
already been well laid out on the current Supreme Court by these dissenters, I will spend
somewhat more time laying out the argument in the education context.
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the sort of categorical opposition to the use of race in anything
other than a strictly remedial context35 that is rapidly becoming its
chief competition.36 The most direct religious parallel to the inclusion of racial communities of interest in districting and racial diversity in admissions comes in the line of cases from Widmar
through Rosenberger, mandating the inclusion of religious groups
in opportunities offered by public schools.37 As I will discuss in
detail below, a hallmark of these cases is their focus, not on discrimination between religions, or between religion and atheism or
nonreligion, but rather between religion and other bases for inclusion or selection for governmentally provided opportunities.
The notion that religion and the religious cannot be singled out
for extraordinarily unfavorable treatment extends beyond the
Widmar/Rosenberger line of cases. Closely related to cases involving
participation of religious groups in conceptual public fora like the
Rosenberger funding scheme are those involving the inclusion of
religious speech literally in the public square. As Scalia wrote in
Capitol Square Review Bd. v Pinette,38 ‘‘[T]he State may not, on the
claim of misperception of ofﬁcial endorsement, ban all private religious speech from the public square, or discriminate against it by
requiring religious speech alone to disclaim public sponsorship.’’
Here again, analogies between extraordinarily discriminatory
treatment for race and for religion spring readily to hand. Just as

35
The distinct aspects of afﬁrmative action and race-conscious districting as remedies for
prior discrimination are not directly related to or addressed by my argument in this article.
Although there may be disagreement about the appropriate circumstances, there is no disagreement on the Court that, in such circumstances, both racial afﬁrmative action and the
use of race in districting can be justiﬁed as such a remedy.
36
I am not arguing that logical consistency necessarily demands parallel treatment of race
and religion. One might well see analogies breaking down or see comparatively greater risk
from either recognition of race or that of religion. But one should at least acknowledge
and respond to the parallel structure of the argument to a greater degree than has yet been
done by those Justices in the Court majority in both lines of cases.
37
Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981); Mergens, 496 US 226 (1990); Lamb’s Chapel v
Steigerwald, 508 US 384 (1993); Rosenberger, 515 US 819 (1995). The latest in this line of
cases, Good News Club v Milford Central School, reported below at 202 F3d 502 (2d Cir
2000), is presently before the Court. The chief new wrinkle in Good News Club is that the
school at which the club, led by an adult minister rather than students, wished to hold
meetings of religious instruction immediately after the school day, was an elementary
school; the prospective members included ﬁrst graders. Largely because of these distinctions, the Second Circuit upheld the school’s decision to exclude the club.
38
515 US 753, 769 (1995).
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Scalia in Pinette sees it as ‘‘perverse’’ 39 to argue that religious
speech should fare worse than pornography and commercial
speech, given the special constitutional status of religion, so Stevens in Shaw v Reno sees it as ‘‘perverse,’’ 40 given AfricanAmericans’ special constitutional status, to have them fare worse in
opportunities to obtain representation than Republicans and rural
voters.41
And, just as in Rosenberger the Court held that the University of

39
Pinette, 515 US at 766–67 (‘‘Private religious speech cannot be subject to veto by those
who see favoritism where there is none. The contrary view . . . exiles private religious
speech to a realm of less-protected expression heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit
displays and commercial speech. . . . It will be a sad day when this Court . . . ﬁnds the
First Amendment more hospitable to private expletives . . . than to private prayers. This
would be merely bizarre were religious speech simply protected by the Constitution as
other forms of private speech; but it is outright perverse when one considers that private
religious expression receives preferential treatment under the Free Exercise Clause.’’) (citations omitted).
40
Shaw v Reno, 509 US at 677 and n 4 (1993) (Stevens dissenting) (‘‘Finally, we must
ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to beneﬁt an underrepresented minority
group becomes impermissible when the minority group is deﬁned by its race. The Court
today answers this question in the afﬁrmative, and its answer is wrong. If it is permissible
to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members,
for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is
permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history
in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. . . . A contrary conclusion
could only be described as perverse. . . . The Court’s opinion suggests that AfricanAmericans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer speciﬁc
beneﬁts from redistricting. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups
deﬁned by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context.’’) (citations omitted).
41
Scalia and Stevens elsewhere make arguments that mirror one another without acknowledging any resemblances or inconsistencies. As I have noted before, for example,
other than the substitution of sex for race, the position on the relationship between remedy
and standing that Scalia articulates in his JEB dissent is identical to what Stevens set forth
in his Shaw v Reno opinion, a tension neither Scalia nor Stevens bothers to resolve or even
acknowledge. Scalia’s own focus on the individual in race cases is in substantial tension
with his willingness to focus on the group in sex cases. This inconsistency is common
among conservatives—Ted Olson, admittedly a hired gun, but one who frequently chooses
his clients for the ideological appeal of their position, represented both Virginia in the
Supreme Court argument of the VMI case, U.S. v Virginia, 318 US 515 (1996), and Cheryl
Hopwood in her litigation successfully challenging the University of Texas’s afﬁrmative
action policies. This put him squarely on both sides of the antistereotyping question. For
women, Olson argued to the Supreme Court, individual merit was or should legally be
irrelevant—group averages or tendencies could and should shape the law and exceptions
be damned. But, in Hopwood, he successfully insisted on behalf of plaintiffs that all applicants
to the University of Texas Law School be evaluated as individuals and not lumped with
their racial group. Mary Anne Case, ‘‘The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns’’: Constitutional
Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 Cornell L Rev 1447, 1472 n 124
(2000).
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Virginia could not single out for exclusion from funding religiously
colored polemic, so in Church of the Lukumi 42 it held that a city
cannot single out for disfavor religious reasons for killing animals.
Again, importantly for the afﬁrmative action and districting analogies I am pressing, in neither case was the relevant discrimination
between religions43 or even in a technical sense between religion
and nonreligion or atheism, but rather it was between religious
motivations and all others, like racial bases for community or diversity and all others.
The same notion of nondiscrimination against the religious underlies, according to Justice Scalia, the constitutionally mandated
payment of unemployment compensation to those whose reason
for unemployment is their religion: ‘‘[O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has
in place a system of individualized exemptions, it may not refuse
to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.’’ 44 When similarly individualized assessments are
made of candidates for admissions or employment, excluding only
their race from consideration as a factor may be, I would argue,
similarly problematic. While I do not quite wish to argue that the
makers of such individualized assessments ‘‘may not refuse to extend that system to [race] without compelling reason,’’ their willingness to include race in the system, as those engaged in voluntary
afﬁrmative action do, should be seen as solving a potential constitutional problem, not just creating one. To pursue the religious
analogy, such actions by admissions and hiring committees should
be seen as at least comparable to permissible accommodation of
religion, if not to required accommodation like that in the pre42

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, v City of Hiahleah, 508 US 520 (1993).

43

The relevant contrast for the Court in Church of the Lukumi is not between religions,
notwithstanding the care the statute’s drafters took to protect kosher butchering. See id at
535.
44
Employment Division v Smith, 594 US 872, 884 (1990), citing Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693,
708 (1986). In Roy, the plurality observed that, ‘‘The statutory conditions at issue in [Sherbert and Thomas] provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation
beneﬁts if, ‘without good cause,’ he had quit work or refused available work. The ‘good
cause’ standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions. If a state creates such
a mechanism, its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests
a discriminatory intent. Thus, as was urged in Thomas, to consider a religiously motivated
exemption to be ‘without good cause’ tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards
religion.’’ Thus, the unemployment cases can be seen ‘‘as a protection against unequal
treatment rather than a grant of favored treatment for the members of the religious sect.’’
U.S. v Lee, 455 US 252, 263 n 3 (1981) (Stevens concurring).

7]

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

337

Smith Supreme Court unemployment compensation cases.45 This
is particularly so given how narrowly states were otherwise permitted to deﬁne ‘‘good cause’’ for unemployment in these cases, excluding, for example, family obligations.46
Finally, although the case law is a thorny thicket into which I
do not wish to wade deeply for present purposes, there are analogies in the Court’s treatment of tax exemptions and direct and
indirect governmental subsidies to religious organizations, notably
sectarian schools: ‘‘[G]overnment grants exemptions to religious
organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of
American society by their religious activities. . . . [The] state encourages these activities not because it champions religion per se
but because it values religion among a variety of private, nonproﬁt
enterprises that contribute to the diversity of the Nation. Viewed
in this light, there is no nonreligious substitute for religion as an
element of our societal mosaic, just as there is no nonliterary substitute for literary groups.’’ 47 (And no nonracial substitute for racial
groups?)
One might argue that an important difference between the religion and race cases I am discussing, a difference that vitiates the
force of my analogy, is that, in the race cases, but not in the religion cases, the state actor must be conscious of the suspect criterion and must use it in decision making. In other words, opponents
of my argument would claim, while the religion cases require the
state to be blind to the claimants’ religion (religion-blind), to grant
beneﬁts without regard to religion, the race cases would require
it to be conscious of the claimant’s race (race-conscious), to grant
beneﬁts on account of race. I believe this difference to be overstated as a formal matter and, in any event, less than fully determinative as a conceptual matter.48 Whether or not religious classiﬁ45
Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963); Thomas v Review Bd., 450 US 707 (1980); Hobbie
v Unemployment App. Commission, 480 US 136 (1986).
46
See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 US at 419 (Harlan dissenting).
47

Walz, 397 US at 688, 693 (1970) (Brennan concurring).
As a conceptual matter, it is, for example, important to remember that the constitutional
equality guarantee is not textually or conceptually the same as, for example, the Title VII
antidiscrimination guarantee. The Fourteenth Amendment does not ban race discrimination; it guarantees equal protection of the laws to persons of all races. The question to be
asked is not whether prohibition on the use of the category of race in, for example, admissions or districting is race discrimination (it is not), but whether such a prohibition may
work a denial of equal protection to some persons for whom race is a particularly salient
characteristic.
48
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cations are actually at work in a given case, it is important to
remember that ‘‘we have rejected as unfaithful to our constitutionally protected tradition of religious liberty, any conception of the
Religion Clauses as . . . stating a unitary principle that ‘religion
may not be used as a basis of classiﬁcation for the purposes of
governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of
rights or privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations.’ . . .
Such rigid conceptions of neutrality have been tempered by constructions upholding religious classiﬁcations where necessary to
avoid ‘[a] manifestation of . . . hostility [toward religion] at war
with our national tradition.’’ 49
As a formal matter, in the Widmar/Rosenberger line of cases, not
just any group can have access to facilities or funding, but only
groups organized along appropriate dimensions. The state does,
then, have to ask, ‘‘What sort of group is this?’’ and to use the
answer in its decision making. That Wide Awake’s activities are
recognized by the state actor to be principally religious and not,
for example, political, philanthropic, or social50 is crucial to its
claim of access in Rosenberger.51 Thus, at a certain level, the group’s
central organizing characteristic, what it is that the members of
the group have in common that distinguishes them from other
groups, plays a role in governmental decision making and in the
allocation of governmental beneﬁts in both sorts of cases. Moreover, in both sorts of cases, it is generally in the ﬁrst instance not
the state but the individuals who identify themselves by classiﬁcation, by applying as a group organized along a religious dimension
in the access cases and through ﬁlling out census or application
forms in the race cases.52
Similarly, in the unemployment compensation cases, in asking,
as it must, ‘‘For what reason did a claimant become unemployed?’’
49

McDaniel v Paty, 435 US at 638 (1978) (Brennan concurring).
See Rosenberger, 515 US at 825 (detailing groups eligible and ineligible for university
funding).
50

51
The funding Wide Awake gets is not that dissimilar from the admissions preference
given to black applicants to university. Just as the pool for other funding candidates is
marginally smaller if Wide Awake must be funded, so the odds of all other candidates go
down marginally in the face of a thumb on the scales for blacks. In rejecting the categorical
distinction between funding and access to facilities, the Court in Rosenberger shifted to the
realization that all resources are scarce or none are.
52
By contrast, in cases involving what are now seen as paradigmatically illegitimate racial
classiﬁcations, such as Plessy, 163 US at 549, the state itself is in the ﬁrst instance doing the
classiﬁcations, for example, by telling Plessy he is colored despite his claim to the contrary.

7]

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

339

and using the answer to distinguish between claimants, by treating
religious reasons, but not, for example, family reasons, as acceptable, the state is at some level not ‘‘blind to’’ but ‘‘conscious of ’’
the claimant’s religion. At least after Smith, which rejects a broad
free-exercise-based right of the religiously motivated to exemptions from generally applicable laws, it is not enough of an answer
to invoke the distinctive requirements of the Free Exercise Clause
to distinguish the race from the religion cases.53 Rather, with both
the equal access cases and the unemployment cases, the need to
avoid inequality in treatment rather than any categorical right to
the beneﬁt at issue is doing the bulk of the work in cases beneﬁting
the religious.54
In the public display cases, both menorahs and creches erected
by the state on state property are chosen for display speciﬁcally as
religious symbols, arguably unlike a Christmas tree (whose secular
signiﬁcance may predominate) and also unlike the cross in Pinette
(erected by the Klan and not the state55 and, in that context, having
a signiﬁcance historically more sinister than religious).
A particularly dramatic example of state use of a religious criterion in selection ironically comes from the same circuit that categorically prohibited the use of race in decision making in Hopwood.
The Fifth Circuit, this time sitting en banc, very recently considered the constitutionality of the Beaumont, Texas, public school
system’s Clergy in the Schools program.56 For this program, the
school district on its own initiative enlisted local clergy by invitation to come to school to counsel groups of students on ‘‘secular
issues including race, divorce, peer pressure, discipline and drugs.’’
True to the name the school district had selected for it, the program refused to allow participation by nonclergy, even ‘‘profes53
Nor is the availability of broader First Amendment speech clause arguments sufﬁcient
to distinguish religion cases like Rosenberger from race cases like Bakke: as the Court has
repeatedly recognized, broad First Amendment concerns are implicated in virtually every
aspect of a public university’s intellectual activities, including, speciﬁcally, its freedom to
determine ‘‘who may be admitted to study.’’ T. X. Huxley quoted by Frankfurter in Sweezy
v New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 (1957) and again by Stevens concurring in Widmar,
454 US at 279 n 2.
54
In most of the equal access cases, equal protection claims were raised, but not addressed
by the Supreme Court; there is little reason to think such claims would have been rejected
had it been necessary to reach them.
55
515 US at 758.
56

Doe v Beaumont Ind. School Dist., 2001 US App Lexis 1153 (5th Cir en banc 2001).
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sionals from secular counseling professions.’’ And the only members of other professions participating as such in other school
programs seemed to be law enforcement ofﬁcers. Although my
own view is that Judge Wiener’s Beaumont dissenting opinion for
himself and ﬁve colleagues, arguing that summary judgment
should be entered against the school district, accurately represents
the current state of the law of the religion clauses, ﬁve circuit
judges astonishingly were prepared to issue summary judgment in
the school district’s favor and a controlling minority of three more
remanded for further fact-ﬁnding. I ﬁnd striking the contrast between the Fifth Circuit’s willingness to let Texas schools be religion-conscious and its insistence that they be race-blind.
Although I am not arguing generally that if religious criteria can
be used then so can race, I also ﬁnd the contrast between the Supreme Court’s apparent view of race and religion as criteria in
districting nevertheless worthy of note.57 When Kennedy wrote in
his Kiryas Joel concurrence that ‘‘[t]he real vice of the school district, in my estimation, is that New York created it by drawing
political boundaries on the basis of religion. . . . [I]n my view one
. . . fundamental limitation [imposed by the Establishment Clause]
is that government may not use religion as a criterion to draw
political or electoral lines,’’ 58 he was speaking for himself alone;
no other Justice joined any part of his opinion.59 As noted above,
the dissenting Justices in the Shaw line have contrasted uses of race
in districting called into question by the majority with uses of religion that have not been so questioned.60 Although both the lower
court and the Supreme Court make a point in U.J.O. v Carey of
insisting that ‘‘petitioners enjoyed no constitutional right in reap57
Indeed, in districting it may be more to the point, as the habitual Shaw dissenters have
argued, that if voters’ national origin (e.g., Chinese-American or Russian-American) can
be and is used in districting, race should and could be to at least the same extent. See, e.g.,
Miller, 515 US at 947 (Ginsburg dissenting).
58
512 US at 573, 577.
59
Indeed, three of the other four habitual Shaw line majority—Scalia, Rehnquist, and
Thomas—dissented in Kiryas Joel.
60
See, e.g., Shaw v Reno, 509 US at 677 (Stevens, dissenting) (‘‘If it is permissible to
draw boundaries to provide adequate representation . . . for Hasidic Jews . . . it necessarily
follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for [African-Americans]’’). See also Ginsburg dissenting in Miller v Johnson, 515 US at 945 (citing newspaper report that ‘‘an Irish
Catholic [State Assembly member] ‘wanted his district drawn following [Catholic] parish
lines so all the parishes where he went to baptisms, weddings and funerals would be in his
district’ ’’).
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portionment to separate community recognition as Hasidic
Jews,’’ 61 neither did the courts suggest that the Hasidic community
was precluded from such recognition on Establishment Clause
grounds. There does seem to be a comparable suggestion in the
recent voting rights cases that African-Americans may be precluded from ‘‘separate community recognition’’ because this would
be to assume, stereotypically, that members of the same race have
a community of interest.62
Is the argument I’m making in the afﬁrmative action context
dependent on establishing that diversity is a compelling governmental interest? 63 I don’t think so. The relevant compelling governmental interest is in equal protection:64 it would deny equal
protection to racially deﬁned groups to deny them an opportunity
afforded other groups, in the same way as it denies equal protection to the religious to deny them opportunities afforded others
to compete for funds or to use facilities. A public university can
choose to admit on board scores alone, it can reject diversity entirely in favor of homogeneity65 in its admissions process, but it
cannot seek diversity without being allowed, perhaps in some instances required, to include racial diversity. Similarly, teachers can
be laid off and people sorted into voting districts by lot, but perhaps not by criteria in pari materia with race to the exclusion of
race.
Note that this argument is subtly different from an argument
that diversity is a compelling interest—it does not so much argue
for diversity, but to suggest that, if diversity is sought or mandated
along other dimensions, the Constitution does not require ignoring racial diversity and might even compel racial diversity in cer61
U.J.O. v Carey, 430 US 144, 153 (1977), describing holding of lower court in UJA v
Wilson, 377 F Supp 1164, 1165–66 (ED NY 1974).
62
Compare Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, ‘‘Bizarre’’ Districts
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances After Shaw v Reno, 92 Mich L Rev
483, 578 (1993) (discussing difﬁculty of distinguishing ‘‘legitimate communities of interest
from the now-illegitimate one of race’’).
63

A controversial and somewhat open question in current law, as noted above.

64

Compare Texas Monthly v Bullock, 489 US 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia dissenting) (‘‘[R]ather
than reformulating the Lemon test in ‘accommodation’ cases . . . , one might instead simply
describe the protection of free exercise concerns, and the maintenance of the necessary
neutrality, as ‘secular purpose and effect,’ since they are a purpose and effect approved,
and indeed to some degree mandated, by the Constitution.’’).
65

Of course, not deliberate racial homogeneity.
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tain circumstances.66 Similarly, no one claims that the Free Exercise Clause mandates availability of student funds for religious
activities or of rooms for student prayer, only that (a) the Establishment Clause does not categorically prohibit making such facilities available, and (b) the Equal Protection Clause and the antidiscrimination component of the First Amendment may require them
to be made available to the religious for religious purposes if they
are made available to others for a wide variety of other purposes.
How do these claims differ from a claim that free exercise requires
provision to the religious? First, the state actor need not establish
a forum at all and can also restrict it to activities not remotely in
pari materia with religion. For example, I know of no one who
seriously suggests that if the only extracurricular activities a given
school offers are sports, the exclusion of a Christian fellowship
seeking to use the playing ﬁelds for prayer group meetings would
create a constitutional problem. But, if a much broader spectrum
of activities has access to school facilities and support, not only
will the Establishment Clause not stand in the way, the Equal Protection Clause may require that the religious also have access to
funding or space for their activities.67
Similarly, a university selecting on SAT scores alone need not
add race to the mix (at least absent a history of discrimination or
66
See Bakke, 438 US at 403, 404, 406 (opinion of Blackmun) (‘‘The number of qualiﬁed,
indeed highly qualiﬁed applicants to medical schools in the United States far exceeds the
number of places available. . . . It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over
a program where race is an element of consciousness, and yet to be aware of the fact, as
we are, that institutions of higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate level than
on the graduate level, have given conceded preferences up to a point to those possessed
of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to the afﬂuent who may bestow their largess
on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the famous, and the
powerful. . . . [G]overnmental preference has not been a stranger to our legal life. We see
it in veterans’ preferences. We see it in aid-to-the-handicapped programs. We see it in the
progressive income tax. We see it in the Indian programs . . . . And in the admissions ﬁeld,
as I have indicated, educational institutions have always used geography, athletic ability,
anticipated ﬁnancial largess, alumni pressure, and other factors of that kind.’’).
67
See, more generally, Michael McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U Chi L Rev 115, 189 (1992) (‘‘The problem with the
secularization baseline is that it is not neutral. . . . [W]hen the government owns . . . many
of the principal institutions of culture, exclusion of religious ideas, symbols, and voices
marginalizes religion in much the same way that the neglect of the contributions of African
American and other minority citizens, or of the viewpoints and contributions of women,
once marginalized those segments of the society. . . . When the public sphere is open to
ideas and symbols representing nonreligious viewpoints, cultures, and ideological commitments, to exclude all those whose basis is ‘religious’ would profoundly distort public
culture.’’).
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a strong disparate-impact argument), but it is not precluded from
so doing, and, depending on what all else it considers, one can
imagine situations under which it may be required to include race.
Consider, for example, an entering class selected to ‘‘look like
America’’ 68 along every conceivable dimension but race. Or consider, more plausibly, in the voting rights arena, a redistricting plan
in which every large concentrated group but blacks can elect a
representative, but blacks cannot. Under certain circumstances the
latter plan may violate the Voting Rights Act, it may constitute
vote dilution, and it may be unconstitutional.69
Making sure that other constituencies70 have their representatives, whether in the legislature (as in voting rights cases), in the
classroom (as in admissions cases), or on the airwaves (as in the
licensing cases), but excluding racially deﬁned constituencies,
works a discrimination so long as there still are racially deﬁned
constituencies.71 This is especially so when racial constituencies are
asymmetrically distributed throughout the relevant population—
asymmetrically in two senses: ﬁrst, in that racial identity means
more to some than to others,72 and second, in that those to whom
racial identity is most salient are in the literal sense a minority
group. Compare members of some minority religions, more intensely committed to religion and less likely to be in the political
majority than the average citizen. Just as, predictably, more members of minority religions will ﬁnd their employer’s requirements
68
In the phrase used by the Clinton administration to describe its ambitions for the
Cabinet.
69
Stevens, dissenting in Miller v Johnson, 515 US at 933 (‘‘I have long believed [citing
Cousins] that treating racial groups differently from other identiﬁable groups of voters, as
the Court does today, is itself an invidious racial classiﬁcation. Racial minorities should
receive neither more nor less protection than other groups against gerrymanders. A fortiori,
racial minorities should not be less eligible than other groups to beneﬁt from districting
plans the majority designs to aid them.’’).
70
Even religious constituencies, as noted above.
71
‘‘[R]ace remains a deﬁning characteristic of American life. Even in a world of racial
equality, the educational imperative that Justice Powell identiﬁed in Bakke would exist as
long as one’s race was so prominent a part of one’s experience.’’ Introduction to the expert
submissions of the University of Michigan in Gratz v Bollinger, No 97-75321 (ED Mich)
4–5.
72
Consider, e.g., the high frequency with which members of racial minorities, compared
to others, put race on even a very short list of their deﬁning characteristics: when asked
to describe themselves using only three adjectives, disproportionately many blacks and females as compared with whites and males listed their race and sex. See, e.g., Patricia A.
Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, in Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne
Kennedy, eds, Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender 263, 270 (1991).
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incompatible with their religion and thus will be eligible for beneﬁts, so predictably more members of minority racial and ethnic
groups will ﬁnd themselves underrepresented at state universities
and will be eligible for admission on a diversity rationale.
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit lists a slew of characteristics an
admissions ofﬁce is permitted to consider: ‘‘A university may properly favor one applicant over another because of his ability to play
the cello, make a downﬁeld tackle, or understand chaos theory. An
admissions process may also consider an applicant’s home state or
relationship to school alumni. Law schools speciﬁcally may look
at things such as unusual or substantial extracurricular activities in
college, which may be atypical factors affecting undergraduate
grades. Schools may even consider factors such as whether an applicant’s parents attended college or the applicant’s economic and
social background.’’ 73 If all of these characteristics are indeed considered, and race may not be, a discrimination is worked against
those who offer racial diversity.74
The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood strongly disagrees with this analysis, claiming that ‘‘the caselaw [i]s sufﬁciently established that the
use of ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even
as part of the consideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional. . . .’’ 75 Among that court’s premises is that, unlike other
73

Hopwood, 78 F3d at 946 (5th Cir 1996).
Interestingly, Scalia, dissenting in Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 423–24 (1991), seems
to understand almost exactly this point in the context of race-based peremptory challenges.
He insisted in that context that ‘‘When a particular group has been singled out in this
fashion, its members have been treated differently, and have suffered the deprivation of a
right and responsibility of citizenship. But when that group, like all others, has been made
subject to peremptory challenge on the basis of its group characteristic, its members have
been treated not differently but the same. In fact, it would constitute discrimination to
exempt them from the peremptory-strike exposure to which all others are subject. If, for
example, men were permitted to be struck but not women, or fundamentalists but not
atheists, or blacks, but not whites, members of the former group would plainly be the object
of discrimination. . . . Unlike the categorical exclusion of a group from jury service, which
implies that all its members are incompetent or untrustworthy, a peremptory strike on the
basis of group membership implies nothing more than the undeniable reality (upon which
the peremptory strike system is largely based) that all groups tend to have particular sympathies or hostilities—most notably sympathies toward their own group members. Since that
reality is acknowledged as to all groups, and forms the basis for peremptory strikes as to
all of them, there is no implied criticism or dishonor to a strike.’’
Because the Court’s liberal wing, in the majority in Powers, disagrees with Scalia about the
stigma of a strike and also disagrees with him about the constitutional difference between a
‘‘welcome mat’’ and a ‘‘no trespassing sign,’’ they are less susceptible to a charge of inconsistency than Scalia and the Court’s conservatives in this matter.
74

75

Hopwood, 78 F3d at 945–46 (5th Cir 1996) (citations omitted).
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characteristics, race may not constitutionally be used as an imperfect proxy and it is at best an imperfect proxy for characteristics
a school may legitimately seek in applicants. But is it really imperfect here? I have elsewhere already questioned some aspects of the
narrowness of the Supreme Court’s remedial exception for racial
classiﬁcations, arguing that, as the Supreme Court appears to have
recognized with respect to sex, but notoriously not yet with respect
to race, 100 percent of members of the historically subordinated
group or suspect class, including those not demonstrably materially
affected by discrimination, are subject to ambient discrimination
on the basis of their membership in the group.76
And is race really a proxy here at all? Afﬁrmative action in hiring
and admissions need not proceed from the (stereotyping) assumption that blacks think alike or think differently from whites, but
can instead proceed from exactly the opposite assumption.77 It can
proceed from the assumption that, by experience with black teachers and students who are no different than their white counterparts, students will realize the error of their previous stereotypic
thinking about blacks: they will realize that there is no difference
and will learn to reject ‘‘ ‘existing misconceptions and stereotypical
categorizations which in turn lead to future patterns of discrimination.’ ’’ 78 In insisting that ‘‘[t]he use of race, in and of itself, to
choose students simply achieves a student body that looks different
[and that] Such a criterion is no more rational on its own terms
than would be choices based on the physical size or blood type of
applicants,’’ 79 the Hopwood court misses the point. It is an accident
76

See Mary Anne Case, ‘‘The Very Stereotype,’’ 85 Cornell L Rev at 1454–55, 1460–61.

77

To put it in Alex Johnson’s terms, if admitted black students play bid whist, they can
offer cultural diversity; but if they play bridge instead, they can demonstrate that blacks,
too, play this card game like the white majority. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and
United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 Cal L Rev
1401 (1993) (using the metaphor of bid whist and tonk, card games favored by AfricanAmericans, to describe a unique African-American culture potentially threatened by forced
integration).
78
Taxman, 91 F3d at 1577 (Lewis dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Stevens makes
a similar argument in his Wygant dissent, 476 US at 315. And Justice O’Connor was quite
right to note that, ‘‘The goal of providing ‘role models’ discussed by the courts below
should not be confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity among
the faculty. . . . [T]his latter goal was not urged as such in support of the layoff provision
before the [courts below].’’ Wygant, 476 US at 288 (O’Connor concurring in part and in
the judgment).
79
Note that more than skin color was in fact at stake for the UT admissions ofﬁcials,
because they did not consider a black Nigerian to be a minority candidate. Hopwood, 78
F3d at 936 n 4.

346

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2000

of history that in the United States race has the sort of salience
that leads to worrisome stereotypical categorizations and blood
type does not, such that government here has a compelling interest
in eradicating stereotypes with respect to race and not blood type,
even through occasional afﬁrmative use of racial classiﬁcations to
do so. In a place like Japan, by contrast, where there has been a
widespread popular belief that blood type does determine character, so that many believe one proﬁtably could select employees,
political candidates, and prospective mates by blood type,80 it
might make the same kind of sense to implement an admissions
program seeking diversity by blood type, not in an endorsement
of the ultimate rationality of blood type discrimination, but in an
effort to eradicate such discriminatory impulses in the next generation.81 The Hopwood majority is therefore wrong to claim so categorically that ‘‘Within the general principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the use of race in admissions for diversity in higher
education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal
protection.’’ 82
One lesson of all the educational afﬁrmative action cases from
De Funis through Hopwood is that constitutional difﬁculties will
arise when admissions ofﬁcers ‘‘compar[e] minority applicants only
with one another.’’ 83 But there are two radically different ways to
compare them with the whole of the applicant pool, as William
80
See, e.g., Jennifer Trueland, Japanese Search in Vein for Perfect Blood Type, The Scotsman
12 (Aug 13, 1998); Associated Press, ‘‘What’s Your Blood Type?’’ Endures as one of Japan’s
Best Pickup Lines, Chicago Tribune North Sports Final Edition N34 (Dec 18, 1997).
81
See Bowen et al’s evidence, adopted in Gratz, of beneﬁt to white majority from exposure to minorities.
82
Hopwood, 78 F3d at 945. The Hopwood majority appears to proceed from the assumption
that the alternative to the use of race as a factor in admissions is the treatment of all
applicants ‘‘as individuals.’’ 78 F3d at 945, 940. But admission to law or medical school is
not like bidding on a road contract. It is not even like admission to graduate school, where
applicants can provide evidence of earlier academic work in the ﬁeld. It is more like admission to a jury. Challenges are peremptory, rarely for cause. It is necessarily proxy thinking
that gets one selected, because there is rarely available direct evidence of the ability to do
what one is asking to do. It makes little sense to talk of treating people as individuals by,
for example, taking their family circumstances into account, because we do not all react
the same way to circumstance. An admissions ofﬁcer can only bet that, for example, plaintiff
Hopwood’s own difﬁcult family circumstances (including a severely handicapped child) will
give her ‘‘a different perspective’’ (and hence make her a better bet) or ‘‘burden . . . her
academic performance’’ (and hence make her a worse bet)—both possibilities considered
by the Hopwood appeals court, 78 F3d at 946–47, in a tacit admission of the proxy character
of any factor in the decision.
83

De Funis v Odegaard, 416 US 312, 330 (1974) (Douglas dissenting).
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Bowen points out in his expert testimony in the Michigan case,
recapitulating what Powell cites him for in Bakke:84 the ﬁrst is to
use a single metric for all applicants but to consider each individually and in isolation, and the second is to give some attention to
the shape of the class as a whole, seeking diversity along a number
of fronts—balancing the percentage of athletes and musicians, and,
on a ﬁner grain, making sure that, among musicians, there aren’t
a dozen cellists and no timpanist, and among athletes not a dozen
linebackers and no quarterback. As Bowen acknowledges, this
means that in any given year, as compared with any particular applicant pool, an individual’s chances, given his or her mix of talents
and attributes, will be affected by the talents and attributes of others in the pool in ways much more complicated and nuanced than
in simple head-to-head competition.85
84

Expert report of William G. Bowen in Gratz (1999) at 147.
[T]he task of an admissions ofﬁcer is not simply to decide which applicants offer
the strongest credentials as separate candidates for the college; the task, rather is
to assemble a total class of students, all of whom will possess the basic qualiﬁcations, but who will also represent, in their totality, an interesting and diverse amalgam of individuals who will contribute through their diversity to the quality and
vitality of the overall educational environment.
This concern for the composition of the undergraduate student body, as well
as for the qualiﬁcations of its individual members, takes many forms. While a
school is of course interested in enrolling students who are good at a great many
things and not one-dimensional in any sense, it should also try to enroll students
with special interests and talents in the arts and in athletics; it should seek a wide
geographical representation; it should admit foreign students from a variety of
countries and cultures; it should recognize the special contribution that the sons
and daughters of alumni can make by representing and communicating a sense
of the traditions and the historic continuity of the university; it should enroll
students from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds; and it should work consciously and deliberately to include minority students, who themselves represent
a variety of experiences and viewpoints.
We must accept it as a fact of life in contemporary America that the perspectives
of individuals are often affected by race as by other aspects of their background.
If a university were unable to take into account the race of candidates, it would
be much more difﬁcult to consider carefully and conscientiously the composition
of an entering class that would offer a rich educational experience to all its
members.

85
Compare Wygant, 476 US at 318 (Stevens dissenting) (the loss ‘‘to petitioners is not
based on any lack of respect for their race, or on blind habit and stereotype. Rather, petitioners have been laid off for a combination of two reasons: the economic conditions that
have led Jackson to lay off some teachers, and the special contractual protections intended
to preserve the newly integrated character of the faculty. . . . Thus, the same harm might
occur if a number of gifted young teachers had been given special contractual protections
because their specialties were in short supply. . . . A Board decision to grant immediate
tenure to a group of experts in computer technology, an athletic coach, and a language
teacher, for example, might reduce the pool of teachers eligible for layoffs during a depression and therefore have precisely the same impact as the racial preference at issue here.’’).
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Does it follow that whites are entitled to comparable preferences? Ordinarily not. Whiteness is not the salient characteristic,
the source of diversity or community for most whites. The claim
is not that blacks denied an opportunity for afﬁrmative action preference are disadvantaged vis-à-vis those of other races, but vis-àvis those who offer another basis for inclusion. Just as in Rosenberger, Lamb’s Chapel and the school club cases the claim is that
the religious are disadvantaged, not as compared to the unreligious, atheists, or those of another religion, but as compared to,
for example, chess players,86 so here the claim is that blacks denied
a preference opportunity in admissions are disadvantaged as compared with legacies, farm kids, Nebraskans,87 tuba players, and
quarterbacks; and in districting as compared with farmers, Republicans, city dwellers, and Polish-Americans. There might be a reason to offer scholarship opportunities or admission preferences for
whites at historically black colleges (‘‘HBC’’s), but not at Texas,
because whiteness is not a salient characteristic for applicants to
Texas. There might also be some reason to consider concentrated
groups of white supremacists to be a ‘‘community of interest’’ for
districting purposes, for example, in Metairie, Louisiana, where
electoral support for David Duke was concentrated.88
Of course, if excluding only religion or race is a problem, including it alone may also be.89 In both districting and law school admissions, Texas paid unique attention to race.90 This predominance
86

See Mergens, 496 US at 254.

87

Although there is something to be said for geographical diversity as a value, the sinister
antisemitic origins of some of Harvard College’s own emphasis on geographical diversity
should not be forgotten. ‘‘Those aren’t doughnuts, they’re bagels,’’ was the retort Harvard
admissions dean Chase Peterson got from a Jewish faculty member in 1971, when he acknowledged that Harvard might be taking fewer students from what Peterson called the
‘‘doughnuts around the big cities.’’ See Nora Sayre, Sixties Going on Seventies 107 (1973).
88
See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of ‘‘Our Constitution Is Color Blind,’’ 44 Stan L Rev at
64–68 (suggesting ‘‘free exercise of race’’ includes ‘‘the attachment of many white southerners to the Confederate ﬂag’’).
89
Compare Arizona Governing Committee v Norris, 463 US 1073, 1077 (1983) (holding
retirement scheme violated Title VII when ‘‘[s]ex is the only factor that the tables use to
classify individuals of the same age; the tables do not incorporate other factors correlating
with longevity such as smoking habits, alcohol consumption, weight, medical history, or
family history’’); L.A. Dept. of Water and Power v Manhart, 435 US 702, 712–13 (1978)
(holding pension scheme with ‘‘an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex’’ violated Title
VII).
90
In Bush v Vera, it relied on the availability of uniquely detailed racial data, ‘‘at the
block-by-block level, whereas other data, such as party registration and past voting statistics,
were only available at the level of voter tabulation districts,’’ 517 US at 961. In Hopwood,

7]

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

349

or privileging of race, like a comparable predominance or privileging of religion, is harder to justify than the use of race as one of
several factors,91 even if sometimes it is then the determinative factor. The ﬂip side of Widmar,92 which allowed student groups to
use school facilities for worship on the same terms as other student
groups used the same facilities for other purposes, is Santa Fe Ind.
School Dist. v Doe,93 which prohibited selection of a single student
speciﬁcally to lead a prayer before the assembled spectators at all
school football games. The ﬂip side of Church of the Lukumi, which
prevents the legislature from singling out a religiously motivated
activity for special disadvantage, is Kiryas Joel, which prevents the
although it used a larger number of more subjective factors in ultimate admissions decisions,
it sorted all candidates initially only by race and by TI score (a weighted index of GPA
and board scores), 78 F3d at 935–36.
91
Compare Widmar, 454 US at 277 (‘‘[T]here are over 100 recognized student groups
at UMKC. The provision of beneﬁts to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important
index of secular effect. . . . At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious
groups will dominate UMKC’s open forum, . . . the advancement of religion would not
be the forum’s ‘primary effect.’ ’’) (citations omitted); Mergens, 496 US at 250 (‘‘To the
extent that a religious club is merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs,
students should perceive no message of government endorsement of religion.’’); Estate of
Thorton v Calder, 472 US 703, 711 (1985) (O’Connor concurring) (‘‘The statute singles out
Sabbath observers for special, and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection without
according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other
private employees’’). Adarand, 515 US at 258 (Stevens dissenting) (‘‘Unlike the 1977 Act
[at issue in Fullilove], the present statutory scheme does not make race the sole criterion
of eligibility for participation in the program. Race does give rise to rebuttable presumption
of social disadvantage which . . . gives rise to a second rebuttable presumption of economic
disadvantage. . . . But a small business may qualify as a [Disadvantaged Business Enterprise]
by showing that it is both socially and economically disadvantaged, even if it receives neither
of these presumptions. . . . Thus, the current preference is more inclusive than the 1977
Act because it does not make race a necessary qualiﬁcation.’’); Metro Broadcasting v FCC,
497 US 547, 621 (1990) (O’Connor dissenting) (citing Bakke for the proposition that ‘‘race
conscious measures might be employed to further diversity only if race were one of many
aspects of background sought and considered relevant to achieving a diverse student body’’
and noting that, by contrast, ‘‘of all the varied traditions and ideas shared among our citizens, the FCC has sought to amplify only those particular views it identiﬁes through the
classiﬁcations most suspect under the Equal Protection clause’’). But see Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v Amos, 483 US 327, 338 (1987) (‘‘We ﬁnd unpersuasive the District Court’s
reliance on the fact that Section 702 singles out religious entities for a beneﬁt. . . . Where,
as here, the government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens
the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged
with beneﬁts to secular entities.’’).
92
See Chess v Widmar, 635 F2d 1310, 1316 (8th Cir 1980), aff’d sub nom. Widmar v
Vincent (‘‘In contrast with a neutral policy, UMKC’s current regulation has the primary
effect of inhibiting religion, an effect which violates the Establishment Clause just as does
governmental advancement of religion. . . . The University’s policy singles out and stigmatizes certain religious activity and, in consequence, discredits religious groups.’’).
93

530 US 290 (2000).
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legislature from singling out a religiously motivated activity for
unique advantage.94
Powell’s vision in Bakke, by contrast, is like the Court majority’s vision
in NEA v Finley,95 with race or decency, respectively, being a factor
but not the predominant factor; given weight, but no ﬁxed weight;96
necessarily occasionally determinative (imagine two identical proposed
museum shows, except one includes Serrano’s ‘‘Piss Christ’’ and the
other does not; or two otherwise identical candidates one of whom belongs to a racial minority97). Both Bakke and Finley are repudiations of
the extremes of doctrinal purity, respectively, of colorblindness and of
viewpoint neutrality, made possible by fuzziness around the edges.98
Perhaps my argument can only save afﬁrmative action schemes
where race really is just one of many salient characteristics.99 It
brings us back to Powell in Bakke: ‘‘The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualiﬁcations and characteristics of which racial and ethnic origin is but
a single though important element. Petitioner’s special admissions
program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather
than further the attainment of genuine diversity.’’ 100 My argument
94
It’s no accident that Kennedy writes both Church of the Lukumi and Romer v Evans—
both are about the extraordinary act of singling out. But Kennedy also writes a separate
concurrence in Kiryas Joel, insisting that ‘‘This is not an action in which the government
has granted a beneﬁt to a general class of recipients of which religious groups are just one
part.’’ 512 US at 722. Compare Committee for Public Ed. v Nyquist, 413 US 756, 793 (1973)
(‘‘One further difference between tax exemption for church property and tax beneﬁts for
parents should be noted. The exemption challenged in Walz was not restricted to a class
composed exclusively or even predominantly of religious institutions. Instead, the exemption
covered all property devoted to religious, educational or charitable purposes. As the parties
here must concede, tax reductions authorized by this law ﬂow primarily to the parents of
children attending sectarian, nonpublic schools. Without intimating whether this factor
alone might have controlling signiﬁcance in another context in some future case, it should
be apparent that in terms of the potential divisiveness of any legislative measure the narrowness of the beneﬁtted class would be an important factor.’’).
95
118 S Ct 2168 (1998) (upholding requirement that judging of NEA grant applications
‘‘tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs
and values of the American public’’).
96
Compare the notion in the districting cases that race may be ‘‘a factor’’ but not ‘‘the
predominant factor.’’
97
See Taxman, 91 F3d 1547.
98
99

Note both vision metaphors.

On the other hand, there may well be circumstances when no other characteristic has
the same salience.
100
Bakke, 438 US 265 at 314 (1978) (opinion of Powell). Let me insist again that a program excluding solely ethnic diversity, as the Fifth Circuit seems to be imposing in Hopwood,
would also hinder genuine diversity, however.
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may help save some nonremedial use of race in districting, but
not the UT admissions scheme in Hopwood. And it supports the
distinction drawn by the district court in Gratz between the University of Michigan’s now abandoned admissions grids, in which
‘‘the only distinguishing factor . . . was the applicant’s race,’’ and
its current system, which uses race as one of several enumerated
plus factors.101 Those who believe ‘‘[t]here are diversities of gifts
but the same spirit’’ 102 may see this as all to the good—diverse
conceptions of merit produce a better overall class than single metric reliance on test scores.
Kiryas Joel may set a limit on the religion analogies’ usefulness
in justifying existing afﬁrmative action programs: a program intended to beneﬁt only the Satmar Hasidim could not withstand
scrutiny even when put in the form of a generally applicable beneﬁt, as it has been in its last several incarnations before New York
courts that struck each down (let alone when extended to the
Satmar community by name, as it had been in the earlier case before the Supreme Court). Similarly, a program intended to beneﬁt
only blacks or only racial minorities may face difﬁculty, not only
when this is apparent on its face, as in Hopwood, but also when
they are the only true beneﬁciaries, as arguably they were in
Bakke.103 This may a fortiori be true of programs including other
groups only after a legal challenge to preferences for racial minorities only. If we hew to the religion analogy, these newly redesigned
programs may ﬁnd themselves in the same trap as the New York
legislature’s repeated unsuccessful efforts to accommodate Kiryas
Joel, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s requirements, by
101
To ‘‘ﬂag’’ an application so as to keep it in the review pool even when it would not
otherwise ‘‘pass . . . the initial admit threshold,’’ counselors may use the characteristics, not
only of ‘‘under-represented race’’ but also ‘‘high school class rank, unique life experiences,
challenges, circumstances, interests or talents, socioeconomic disadvantage and geography.’’
Gratz at 32 and n 17. In computing the selection index score, not only are twenty points
added to an applicant’s score for belonging to an underrepresented minority group, but
‘‘six for geographic factors, four . . . for alumni relationship, . . . three for an outstanding
essay, ﬁve . . . for leadership and service skills, twenty . . . for socioeconomic status, [and]
twenty . . . for athletes,’’ up to a total of forty. Gratz at 33.
102
I Corinthians 12:4. At the risk of stating the obvious, when I refer to believers in this
proposition, I don’t mean just believers in the New Testament.
103
On some versions of the facts, for at least one of the years in which Alan Bakke applied
to medical school, this was the case at U.C. Davis, where ‘‘disadvantaged whites . . . in
large numbers’’ applied to be considered for one of the places set aside for the ‘‘disadvantaged’’ for which they were at least nominally eligible, but all of those admitted under the
program were members of racial minorities. Bakke, 438 US 265, 273, 275.
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laws of general applicability.104 The New York Court of Appeals
has repeatedly held that the legislative efforts are not ‘‘neutral
law[s] of general application,’’ 105 because, despite their neutral
form, their intent and effect are to ‘‘permit the statute’s beneﬁts
to ﬂow almost exclusively to the religious sect it was plainly designed to aid.’’ 106
Even if redesigned admission plans actually do beneﬁt a broader
group, they may be unconstitutionally tainted by their purpose to
preserve the availability of racial diversity. If the use of race is as
unconstitutional as the Hopwood court suggests, there is, for example, little reason under current disparate-impact doctrine to think
that the solutions Texas proposes, such as the so-called 10 percent
solution,107 ﬁx the problem. For, if these solutions do not have a
disparate impact by race, they will have failed in their purpose, but
if they do, they will have been undertaken ‘‘because of and not in
spite of’’ their disparate impact, thus risking failure of the Supreme
Court’s test for measures that have a disparate impact upon an
identiﬁable group.108 To use other things as a proxy for race may
be no more permissible under the Hopwood standards than to use
race as a proxy for other things.109
104
See Grumet v Cuomo, 90 NY2d 57, 76 (1997) (striking down law general in form, but
on the facts covering only the single district of Kiryas Joel because it ‘‘would be perceived
as an act of governmental favor for the sole beneﬁt of the Satmar sect’’); Grumet v Pataki,
93 NY2d 677 (1999) (striking down reworked general law, this time covering on its facts
Kiryas Joel and only one other district); but cf. Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 227 (1997)
(‘‘Nor are we willing to conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program depends on
the number of sectarian schools that happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid.’’).
105
Grumet v Pataki, 93 NY at 686.
106

Id at 690.

107

See, e.g., David Montejano, Maintaining Diversity at the University of Texas, in Robert
Post and Michael Rogin, eds, Race and Representation: Afﬁrmative Action, 359, 363–67 (1998)
(describing plan ‘‘for the automatic admission of the top ten percent of each graduating high
school class’’ in the highly segregated Texas public school system ‘‘to the Texas university of
their choice.’’
108
See Personnel Admr of Mass. v Feeney, 442 US 256 (1977). But see Grutter v Bollinger
(note 24 above) (holding that the University of Michigan Law School’s ‘‘failure to consider
. . . race-neutral alternatives’’ for ‘‘enrolling signiﬁcant numbers of underrepresented minority students’’ such as ‘‘increasing recruiting efforts, decreasing emphasis for all applicants
on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores, using a lottery system for all qualiﬁed applicants,
or a system, whereby a certain number or percentage of the top graduates from various
colleges and universities are admitted . . . militates against a ﬁnding of narrow tailoring’’).
109
Nor would it necessarily be determinative that the disparate impact is in favor of minorities. Although Feeney itself does speak of ‘‘adverse effects on an identiﬁable group,’’
and although the plan was adopted to help the identiﬁable group of minority students rather
than to hurt whites, the general emphasis on color blindness and a sense that, admissions
being something of a zero sum game, some white applicants stand to lose put the plan at
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Would the need to bring other groups into any afﬁrmative action scheme to save its constitutionality resemble the addition of
elves, santas, and candy canes to Christmas creche scenes in Establishment Clause cases? Compare Lynch,110 rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a public display including, not only a
creche, but also ‘‘a Santa Claus house with a live Santa distributing
candy; reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh; a live 40-ft. Christmas tree
strung with lights; statues of carolers in old-fashioned dress; candystriped poles; a ‘talking’ wishing-well; a large banner proclaiming
‘SEASONS’ GREETINGS’; a miniature ‘village’ with several
houses and a church; and various ‘cutout’ ﬁgures, including those
of a clown, a dancing elephant, a robot and a teddy bear,’’ 111 with
County of Allegheny v ACLU., where a creche standing alone,
framed by evergreens, on the grand staircase of the county courthouse was held an unconstitutional establishment. The fact that
the grand staircase ‘‘occasionally was used for displays other than
the creche (for example, a display of ﬂags commemorating the 25th
anniversary of Israel’s independence)’’112 was found insufﬁcient dilution of the religious message. This is not the paradox of R.A.V.
redux—including racial hate speech as part of a generic prohibition on ﬁghting words, as that case required,113 may too greatly
dilute the intended governmental message that racial hatred is particularly obnoxious, and being surrounded by elves may dilute the
creche’s spiritual message, but inclusion with violinists, farm kids,
and athletes will still beneﬁt minority applicants. If additions dilute
the afﬁrmative action message, like the Christmas message, beyond
recognition, that may be undesirable from the perspective of racial
or religious zealots, but acceptable, even desirable, from a civil
constitutional perspective.
The creche cases have more cautionary parallels to recent voting
rights cases, however.114 Justice O’Connor has insisted for the malegal risk. For discussion, see, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Limitations of RaceNeutral Afﬁrmative Action, 2000 Georgetown L J 2331.
110
111
112
113

465 US 668 (1984).
County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 US 573, 595 (1989).
Id at 599, n 50.

See R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 US 377 (1992).
The creche and voting rights case also, unfortunately, have in common a tendency to
partake of what Pam Karlan has aptly dubbed the new Redrupping. See Pam Karlan, Still
Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post Shaw Era, 26 Cumb L Rev 287, 288
(1996). The Court has shifted its particularistic examination of individual cases in an area
114
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jority in Shaw v Reno that ‘‘reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter.’’ 115 For her, and increasingly for a majority
of the Court, the Establishment Clause is another such area.116 As
she ﬁrst said in her Lynch concurrence, ‘‘Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.’’ 117 This danger
of making the favored feel like insiders and others like outsiders118
carries over to problematic majority-minority districts in voting
rights cases, according to O’Connor, and may even shift from perception to more concrete reality: ‘‘The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious.
When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected ofﬁcials are
for which it has been unable to articulate a workable test of general applicability from the
counting up of body parts and their distance from one another in dirty movies to the
counting up of elves and candy canes and their distance from the creche in Establishment
Clause cases involving use of public property for religious holiday displays; it also now
scrutinizes individually the shape of voting rights districts as it used to scrutinize images
on a screen.
115
Shaw v Reno, 509 US at 647 (1993). The appearance O’Connor thinks dangerously
reinforced by race-conscious districting is that of ‘‘resemblance to political apartheid. It
reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike. . . . We
have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.’’ Id.
116
See Pildes and Niemi, Expressive Harms, 92 Mich L Rev at 512 (arguing that the
‘‘endorsement test’’ for the Establishment Clause ‘‘is grounded on the same concerns as
those central to Shaw’’).
117
465 US at 687 (O’Connor concurring). Brennan, dissenting, quotes language from a
lower court opinion to the effect that, ‘‘Those persons who do not share these holidays
are relegated to the status of outsiders by their own government; those persons who do
observe those holidays can take pleasure in seeing the symbol of their belief given ofﬁcial
sanction and special status.’’ Lynch at 702 n 7.
118
Although articulating this endorsement test most clearly in Lynch, O’Connor does not
think the Lynch creche ﬂunks it. As a white Christian, and therefore accustomed to being
a favored insider in matters racial and religious, she may have difﬁculty hearing the message
outsiders may get. Compare the dissenting Brennan’s observation in Lynch at 496 that ‘‘because the Christmas holiday seems so familiar and agreeable’’ the Court’s majority is blinded
to the ‘‘distinctively sectarian’’ nature of the creche with Pam Karlan’s assertion that the
Court majority can only describe ‘‘the most integrated districts in the country’’ as ‘‘segregated’’ examples of ‘‘political apartheid’’ because they begin, blindly, with the assumption
‘‘that only majority-white and, therefore white-controlled, jurisdictions can be integrated.’’
Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995
Chi L Forum 83, 94, 95. Because they begin with a white, Christian default, some members
of the Court ﬁnd it as difﬁcult to see the racialism of familiar white control as the sectarianism of familiar Christian symbols.
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more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent
only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as
a whole.’’ 119
In order to avoid either a racial or a religious establishment, a
majority of the Supreme Court, in, respectively, its Shaw and its
Lemon120 test, has decreed that neither race nor religion shall be a
dominant consideration for legislative action. Thus, under Shaw
and its progeny, the Court will strike down a districting plan when
‘‘race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was
the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its
district lines.’’ 121 And, under Lemon and its progeny, it will strike
down statutes when ‘‘the preeminent purpose of the . . . legislature
was to advance [a] religious viewpoint. . . .’’ 122 If accommodating
religion can qualify as secular purpose, to what extent will accommodating the Justice Department?
For race and religion, vocal minorities on the Court have belittled the Court’s majority’s fears of establishment, at least when
racial minorities or minority religions attract the legislature’s aid.
Except perhaps in the extraordinary case of majority-minority government,123 claiming that whites are marginalized and black supremacy established by afﬁrmative action may be akin to claiming
that ‘‘after escaping brutal persecution and coming to America
with the modest hope of religious toleration . . . , the Satmar had

119

Shaw v Reno at 648.

120

See Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971).

121

Miller v Johnson, 515 US at 913. See also Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899, 907 (1996) (‘‘Race
was the criterion that, in the State’s view, could not be compromised; respecting communities of interest and protecting Democratic incumbents came into play only after the racebased decision had been made.’’). Note that this approach constructs ‘‘race’’ and ‘‘communities of interest’’ as mutually exclusive. Stevens in dissent replies that he cannot ‘‘see how
our constitutional tradition can countenance the suggestion that a State may draw unsightly
lines to favor farmers or city dwellers, but not to beneﬁt the very group whose history
inspired the Amendment that the Voting Rights Act was designed to implement.’’ Shaw v
Hunt, 517 US at 949. Compare Walz, 397 US at 696 (1970) (Harlan concurring) (‘‘In any
particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a
class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought
to fall within the natural perimeter.’’).
122
Edwards v Aguillard, 482 US 578 (1987). The particular religious viewpoint there at
issue was ‘‘that a supernatural being created humankind,’’ advanced by a statute mandating
the teaching of ‘‘creation science’’ whenever evolution was taught in Louisiana public
schools.
123
See City of Richmond v Croson, 488 US 469 (1989), where blacks were in the majority
in the Richmond city government distributing afﬁrmative action preferences.
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become so powerful, so closely allied with Mammon, as to have
become an ‘establishment’ of the Empire State,’’ as Scalia mockingly suggests in his Kiryas Joel dissent.124
But the ability of various minorities to attract the legislature’s
attention has been a source of fear as well as of comfort in matters
of both race and religion. The greatest fear is of civil discord
brought on by competition for legislative favor. Compare the dissenting Brennan view of civic strife occasioned by competition
among minority religions for government attention125 with Powell’s image in Bakke of the nation dissolving into a welter of ethnic
minority groups each seeking special treatment.126 As commentators have noted, however, systematic exclusion of racial or religious
interests from legislative attention is at least as likely to lead to
political strife.127
124

Kiryas Joel, 512 US at 732 (Scalia dissenting).
Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US at 702 (1983) (Brennan, dissenting) (‘‘[A]fter today’s decision,
administrative entanglements may well develop. Jews and other non-Christian groups . . .
can be expected to press government for inclusion of their symbols, and faced with such
requests, government will have to become involved in accommodating the various demands.
. . . Cf. Nyquist . . . 413 US at 796 . . . (‘competing efforts [by religious groups] to gain
and maintain the support of government . . . occasioned considerable civil strife’).’’ See
also Lemon’s emphasis on ‘‘potential for political divisiveness . . . [in] need for annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow,’’
403 US at 623.
126
Bakke, 438 US 265, 294 (1978) (‘‘[T]he white majority itself is composed of various
minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination. . . . Not
all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance
of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only ‘majority’ left would
be a minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. . . . Courts would be asked to evaluate
the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. Those
whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would
be entitled to preferential classiﬁcations at the expense of other groups. . . . Disparate
constitutional tolerance of such classiﬁcations well may serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic
antagonisms rather than alleviate them.’’). For an alternate nightmare vision see the parade
of horribles in Stevens’s concurrence in Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503, 512 (1986).
According to Stevens, ‘‘the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious
faiths risks being compromised if an observant Jew’s request to wear religious head covering
in contravention of military uniform regulations is granted’’ but there is ‘‘the danger that
a similar claim on behalf of a Sikh or a Rastafarian might readily be dismissed as ‘so extreme,
so unusual or so faddish an image that public conﬁdence in his ability to perform his duties
will be destroyed.’ ’’
127
See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, quoted in Mc Daniel v Paty, 435 US at 640 n 25 (Brennan
concurring) (‘‘To view such religious activity as suspect, or to regard its political results as
automatically tainted . . . might not even succeed in keeping religious controversy out of
public life, given the ‘political ruptures caused by the alienation of segments of the religious
community.’ ’’).
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